accessibility – Jupiter Broadcasting https://www.jupiterbroadcasting.com Open Source Entertainment, on Demand. Thu, 30 Jun 2022 17:42:25 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.5.3 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/cropped-favicon-32x32.png accessibility – Jupiter Broadcasting https://www.jupiterbroadcasting.com 32 32 Linux Action News 247 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/149077/linux-action-news-247/ Thu, 30 Jun 2022 10:00:00 +0000 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/?p=149077 Show Notes: linuxactionnews.com/247

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Show Notes: linuxactionnews.com/247

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Rich Clownshow Services | Coder Radio 457 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/147917/rich-clownshow-services-coder-radio-457/ Wed, 16 Mar 2022 05:30:00 +0000 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/?p=147917 Show Notes: coder.show/457

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Show Notes: coder.show/457

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OpSec for Script Kiddies | TechSNAP 285 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/103321/opsec-for-script-kiddies-techsnap-285/ Thu, 22 Sep 2016 07:37:15 +0000 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/?p=103321 RSS Feeds: HD Video Feed | Mobile Video Feed | MP3 Audio Feed | Ogg Audio Feed | iTunes Feed | Torrent Feed Become a supporter on Patreon: Show Notes: FBI Arrests Two Alleged Members of Group That Hacked the CIA Director “Two young men from North Carolina have been charged with their alleged connection […]

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FBI Arrests Two Alleged Members of Group That Hacked the CIA Director

  • “Two young men from North Carolina have been charged with their alleged connection to the hacking group “Crackas With Attitude.” The group gained notoriety when it hacked into the personal email account of CIA Director John Brennan last year and in the following weeks claimed responsibility for hacking the Department of Justice, email accounts of several senior officials, and other US government systems.”
  • “Andrew Otto Boggs, 22, who allegedly used the handle Incursio, or IncursioSubter, and Justin Gray Liverman, who is suspected of using the moniker D3f4ult, were arrested on Thursday, according to a press release by the US State’s Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of Virginia.”
  • “Crackas With Attitude, or CWA, first sprung on the hacking scene when they broke into Brennan’s AOL email account in October 2015. The group distinguished itself for openly bragging about their exploits and for making fun of their victims online. After hacking into Brennan’s account, one of the members of the group, known as “Cubed,” said it was so easy “a 5 year old could do it.” After Brennan, the group targeted and hacked the accounts of Director Of National Intelligence James Clapper, a White House official, and others.”
  • “Much of the time, the group would use social engineering to gain access to accounts. In February, one member of the group explained to Motherboard how they broke into a Department of Justice system, by calling up the relevant help desk and pretending to be a new employee. That hack led in the exposure of contact information for 20,000 FBI and 9,000 DHS employees.”
  • “The group made heavy use of social media, and in particular Twitter, to spread news of the dumps and mock victims. However, according to the affidavit, Boggs allegedly connected to one of the implicated Twitter accounts (@GenuinelySpooky) from an IP address registered to his father, with whom Boggs lived. Much the same mistake led to Liverman’s identification: an IP address used to access the Twitter handle @_D3F4ULT and another account during the relevant time period was registered to an Edith Liverman. According to the affidavit, publicly available information revealed that Justin Liverman lived with Edith at the time.”
  • “The affidavit also includes several sets of Twitter direct messages between members of the group.”
  • Which suggests Twitter may have provided the government with that data, probably under a subpoena
  • “Liverman seemingly logged his conversations: according to the affidavit, law enforcement found copies of chats on his hard drive, including one where Liverman encouraged Cracka to publish the social security number of a senior US government official. These logs make up a large chunk of the affidavit, laying out the groups alleged crimes in detail, and investigators found other forensics data on Liverman’s computer too.”
  • It really goes to show how unsophisticated these attackers were

Discovering how Dropbox hacks your mac

  • “If you have Dropbox installed, take a look at System Preferences > Security & Privacy > Accessibility tab (see screenshot above). Notice something? Ever wondered how it got in there? Do you think you might have put that in there yourself after Dropbox asked you for permission to control the computer? No, I can assure you that your memory isn’t faulty. You don’t remember doing that because Dropbox never presented this dialog to you, as it should have”
  • “That’s the only officially supported way that apps are allowed to appear in that list, but Dropbox never asked you for that permission. I’ll get to why that’s important in a moment, but if you have the time, try this fascinating experiment: try and remove it.”
  • “That leaves a couple of questions. First, why does it matter, and second, is there any way to keep using Dropbox but stop it having access to control your computer?”
  • “There’s at least three reasons why it matters. It matters first and foremost because Dropbox didn’t ask for permission to take control of your computer. What does ‘take control’ mean here? It means to literally do what you can do in the desktop: click buttons, menus, launch apps, delete files… . There’s a reason why apps in that list have to ask for permission and why it takes a password and explicit user permission to get in there: it’s a security risk.”
  • “The list of authorization “rights” used by the system to manage this “policy based system” is held in /var/db/auth.db database, and a backup or default copy is retained in /System/Library/Security/authorization.plist.”
  • “The allow-root property specifies whether a right should be allowed automatically if the requesting process is running with uid == 0. This defaults to false if not specified.”
  • “In other words, if allow-root isn’t explicitly set, the default is that even a process with root user privileges does not have the right to perform that operation. Since that’s not specified in the default shown above, then even root couldn’t add Dropbox to the list of apps in Accessibility preferences. Is it possible then, that Dropbox had overridden this setting in the auth.db? Let’s go and check!””
  • Basically, by using sqlite directly, rather than the OS X tcc utility, you can override the policy, and add any apps you want to the whitelist. Or worse, any app running as root can do this without you even knowing
  • “I tested this with several of my own apps and found it worked reliably. It’ll even work while System Preferences is open, which is exactly the behaviour I saw with Dropbox. It remained to prove, though, that this was indeed the hack that Dropbox was using, and so I started to look at what exactly Dropbox did after being given an admin password on installation or launch. Using DetectX, I was able to see that Dropbox added a new folder to my /Library folder after the password was entered”
  • “As can be seen, instead of adding something to the PrivilegedHelperTools folder as is standard behaviour for apps on the mac that need elevated privileges for one or two specialist operations, Dropbox installs its own folder containing these interesting items”
  • “the deliciously named dbaccessperm file, we finally hit gold and the exact proof I was looking for that Dropbox was using a sql attack on the tcc database to circumvent Apple’s authorization policy”
  • “What I do suspect, especially in light of the fact that there just doesn’t seem to be any need for Dropbox to have Accessibility permissions, is that it’s in there just in case they want that access in the future. If that’s right, it suggests that Dropbox simply want to have access to anything and everything on your mac, whether it’s needed or not.”
  • “The upshot for me was that I learned a few things about how security and authorisation work on the mac that I didn’t know before investigating what Dropbox was up to. But most of all, I learned that I don’t trust Dropbox at all. Unnecessary privileges and backdooring are what I call untrustworthy behaviour and a clear breach of user trust. With Apple’s recent stance against the FBI and their commitment to privacy in general, I feel moving over to iCloud and dropping Dropbox is a far more sensible way to go for me.”
  • “For those of you who are stuck with Dropbox but don’t want to allow it access to Accessibility features, you can thwart Dropbox’s hack by following my procedure here”
  • Previous Article

Proprietors of vDoS, the DDoS for hire service, arrested

  • “Two young Israeli men alleged to be the co-owners of a popular online attack-for-hire service were reportedly arrested in Israel on Thursday. The pair were arrested around the same time that KrebsOnSecurity published a story naming them as the masterminds behind a service that can be hired to knock Web sites and Internet users offline with powerful blasts of junk data.”
  • “The pair were reportedly questioned and released Friday on the equivalent of about USD $10,000 bond each. Israeli authorities also seized their passports, placed them under house arrest for 10 days, and forbade them from using the Internet or telecommunications equipment of any kind for 30 days.”
  • “Huri and Bidani are suspected of running an attack service called vDOS. As I described in this week’s story, vDOS is a “booter” service that has earned in excess of $600,000 over the past two years helping customers coordinate more than 150,000 so-called distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks designed to knock Web sites offline.”
  • “The two men’s identities were exposed because vDOS got massively hacked, spilling secrets about tens of thousands of paying customers and their targets. A copy of that database was obtained by KrebsOnSecurity.”
  • “For most of Friday, KrebsOnSecurity came under a heavy and sustained denial-of-service attack, which spiked at almost 140 Gbps. A single message was buried in each attack packet: “godiefaggot.” For a brief time the site was unavailable, but thankfully it is guarded by DDoS protection firm Prolexic. The attacks against this site are ongoing.”
  • “At the end of August 2016, the two authored a technical paper (PDF) on DDoS attack methods which was published in the Israeli security e-zine Digital Whisper. In it, Huri signs his real name and says he is 18 years old and about to be drafted into the Israel Defense Forces. Bidani co-authored the paper under the alias “Raziel.b7@gmail.com,” an email address that I pointed out in my previous reporting was assigned to one of the administrators of vDOS.”
  • “Sometime on Friday, vDOS went offline. It is currently unreachable. According to several automated Twitter feeds that track suspicious large-scale changes to the global Internet routing tables, sometime in the last 24 hours vDOS was apparently the victim of what’s known as a BGP hijack.”
  • “Reached by phone, Bryant Townsend, founder and CEO of BackConnect Security, confirmed that his company did in fact hijack Verdina/vDOS’s Internet address space. Townsend said the company took the extreme measure in an effort to get out from under a massive attack launched on the company’s network Thursday, and that the company received an email directly from vDOS claiming credit for the attack.”
  • ““For about six hours, we were seeing attacks of more than 200 Gbps hitting us,” Townsend explained. “What we were doing was for defensive purposes. We were simply trying to get them to stop and to gather as much information as possible about the botnet they were using and report that to the proper authorities.””
  • Krebs also got access to a large log file from the vdos site
  • “The file lists the vDOS username that ordered and paid for the attack; the target Internet address; the method of attack; the Internet address of the vDOS user at the time; the date and time the attack was executed; and the browser user agent string of the vDOS user.”

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Leaky RSA Keys | TechSNAP 231 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/87466/leaky-rsa-keys-techsnap-231/ Thu, 10 Sep 2015 05:03:52 +0000 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/?p=87466 Red Hat highlights how leaky many open source RSA implementations are, Netflix releases Sleepy Puppy & the Mac is definitely under attack. Plus some quick feedback, a rockin’ roundup & much, much more! Thanks to: Get Paid to Write for DigitalOcean Direct Download: HD Video | Mobile Video | MP3 Audio | OGG Audio | […]

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Red Hat highlights how leaky many open source RSA implementations are, Netflix releases Sleepy Puppy & the Mac is definitely under attack.

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— Show Notes: —

NetFlix releases new open source security tool, Sleepy Puppy

  • Sleepy Puppy is a delayed XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) vulnerability scanner
  • In a typical XSS scan, and attacker (or the scanner program) attempts to send a script as part of some user input (the comment on a blog or something like that, or via a URL variable). This content is then shown to that user, and often times, other users. If I can make a bit of my javascript run on your computer, when you visit someone else’s site, I have achieved XSS
  • There are a number of scanners out there, and they “fuzz test” all of the inputs and variables they can find, and attempt to get some code they submit to be returned to them
  • This new tool from NetFlix addresses second level vulnerabilities, and beyond
  • What if an attacker injects the code on the website, and the website mitigates this, but some other application, internal or public facing, also uses the data from the database, and it then ends up being vulnerable to the XSS
  • Sleepy Puppy is a “XSS payload management framework”, it generates unique code snippets for each injection, so that when a successful XSS happens, it can be tracked back to its source, even if that is outside of the application where the exploit took place
  • “Delayed XSS testing is a variant of stored XSS testing that can be used to extend the scope of coverage beyond the immediate application being tested. With delayed XSS testing, security engineers inject an XSS payload on one application that may get reflected back in a separate application with a different origin.”
  • “Here we see a security engineer inject an XSS payload into the assessment target (App #1 Server) that does not result in an XSS vulnerability. However, that payload was stored in a database (DB) and reflected back in a second application not accessible to the tester. Even though the tester can’t access the vulnerable application, the vulnerability could still be used to take advantage of the user. In fact, these types of vulnerabilities can be even more dangerous than standard XSS since the potential victims are likely to be privileged types of users (employees, administrators, etc.)”
  • SleepyPuppy ships with a default set of assessments includes, so is ready to use out of the box

Researchers announce new iOS vulnerability: brokenchain

  • The vulnerability allows a piece of malware to access the keychain in iOS, and copy your saved passwords and other secret keys
  • These keys can then be exfiltrated via SMS or HTTP etc
  • When the malware attempts to access the keychain, iOS presents a dialog asking them user to allow or deny the action, but the malware can simulate a tap on the screen and accept the dialog
  • Further, some malware seems to be able to cause the popup to appear off screen, so the user never even sees it
  • “Special-crafted commands can be triggered by malware — or even an image or video — which causes OS X to display a prompt to click an Allow button. But rather than relying on users clicking on a button that appears unexpectedly, the button is displayed very briefly off the edge of the screen or behind the dock, and is automatically pressed using a further command. It is then possible to intercept a user’s password and send it to the attacker via SMS or any other means.”
  • “Apple has been told about the vulnerability. The company has not only failed to issue a fix yet, but has not even responded to Jebara and Rahbani.”
  • Ars Technica found that parts of the vulnerability have existed since 2011, and have been used actively
  • “DevilRobber, the then new threat caught the attention of security researchers because it commandeered a Mac’s graphics card and CPU to perform the mathematical calculations necessary to mine Bitcoins, something that was novel at the time. Less obvious was the DevilRobber’s use of the AppleScript programming language to locate a window requesting permission to access the Keychain and then simulate a mouse click over the OK button.”
  • “The same technique was being used by the Genieo adware installer to gain access to a Safari extensions list that’s protected inside the Mac Keychain.”
  • The same day, another group of researchers independently found the same vulnerability
  • Windows UAC has a bunch of defenses against apps users accidentally accepting or malware auto-clicking the authorization popups. Maybe we need the same in mobile OSes
  • “Mac users should remember that the technique works only when invoked by an application already installed on their systems. There is no evidence the technique can be carried out through drive-by exploits or attacks that don’t require social engineering and end-user interaction. Still, the weakness is unsettling, because it allows the same app requesting access to the keychain to unilaterally approve it and to do so quickly enough for many users to have no idea what has happened. And by default, OS X will grant the access without requiring the user to enter a password. The Mac keychain is the protected place storing account passwords and cryptographic keys.”
  • Maybe the solution is to require the unlock code or password in order to authorize access to sensitive areas like the keychain
  • “I think that Apple needs to isolate that particular window,” Reed told Ars on Wednesday. “They need to pull that particular window out of the window list … in a way that an app can’t tell it’s on the screen and get its location.”

Factoring RSA keys with TLS Forward Secrecy

  • “Back in 1996, Arjen Lenstra described an attack against an optimization (called the Chinese Remainder Theorem optimization, or RSA-CRT for short). If a fault happened during the computation of a signature (using the RSA-CRT optimization), an attacker might be able to recover the private key from the signature (an “RSA-CRT key leak”). At the time, use of cryptography on the Internet was uncommon, and even ten years later, most TLS (or HTTPS) connections were immune to this problem by design because they did not use RSA signatures.”
  • “This changed gradually, when forward secrecy for TLS was recommended and introduced by many web sites.”
  • “We evaluated the source code of several free software TLS implementations to see if they implement hardening against this particular side-channel attack, and discovered that it is missing in some of these implementations. In addition, we used a TLS crawler to perform TLS handshakes with servers on the Internet, and collected evidence that this kind of hardening is still needed, and missing in some of the server implementations: We saw several RSA-CRT key leaks, where we should not have observed any at all.”
  • “An observer of the private key leak can use this information to cryptographically impersonate the server, after redirecting network traffic, conducting a man-in-the-middle attack. Either the client making the TLS handshake can see this leak, or a passive observer capturing network traffic. The key leak also enables decryption of connections which do not use forward secrecy, without the need for a man-in-the-middle attack. However, forward secrecy must be enabled in the server for this kind of key leak to happen in the first place, and with such a server configuration, most clients will use forward secrecy, so an active attack will be required for configurations which can theoretically lead to RSA-CRT key leaks.”
  • Does this break RSA? No. Lenstra’s attack is a so-called side-channel attack, which means that it does not attack RSA directly. Rather, it exploits unexpected implementation behavior. RSA, and the RSA-CRT optimization with appropriate hardening, is still considered secure.“
  • While it appears that OpenSSL and NSS properly implement the hardening, some other products do not
  • It seems RedHat discovered this issue some time ago, and reported it to a number of vendors
  • Oracle patched OpenJDK back in April
  • “None of the key leaks we observed in the wild could be attributed to these open-source projects, and no key leaks showed up in our lab testing, which is why this additional hardening, while certainly desirable to have, does not seem critical at this time.”
  • “Once the necessary data is collected, the actual computation is marginally more complicated than a regular RSA signature verification. In short, it is quite cheap in terms of computing cost, particularly in comparison to other cryptographic attacks.”
  • Then the most important question came up
  • Does this vulnerability have an name? We think that “RSA-CRT hardening” (for the countermeasure) and “RSA-CRT key leaks” (for a successful side-channel attack) is sufficiently short and descriptive, and no branding is appropriate. We expect that several CVE IDs will be assigned for the underlying vulnerabilities leading to RSA-CRT key leaks. Some vendors may also assign CVE IDs for RSA-CRT hardening, although no key leaks have been seen in practice so far.”
  • Crypto Rundown, Hardened:
    • GnuPG
    • NSS
    • OpenSSL 1.0.1l
    • OpenJDK8 (after the April patch)
    • cryptlib (hardening disabled by default)
  • Unhardened:
    • GNUTLS (via libgcrypt and Nettle)
    • Go 1.4.1
    • libgcrypt (1.6.2)
    • Nettle (3.0.0)
    • ocaml-nocrypto (0.5.1)
    • OpenSwan (2.6.44)
    • PolarSSL (1.3.9)
  • Technical Record [PDF]

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