Pwn2Own – Jupiter Broadcasting https://www.jupiterbroadcasting.com Open Source Entertainment, on Demand. Mon, 22 Feb 2016 02:44:52 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.5.3 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/cropped-favicon-32x32.png Pwn2Own – Jupiter Broadcasting https://www.jupiterbroadcasting.com 32 32 WebRTC vs Skype | Tech Talk Today 92 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/71622/webrtc-vs-skype-tech-talk-today-92/ Mon, 17 Nov 2014 10:16:21 +0000 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/?p=71622 The US State Department shuts down its email in what can only be described as a major overreaction, WebRTC sees a major breakthrough that will bring major competition to Skype. Plus the big results from Mobile Pwn2Own 2014 & more! Direct Download: MP3 Audio | OGG Audio | Video | HD Video | Torrent | […]

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The US State Department shuts down its email in what can only be described as a major overreaction, WebRTC sees a major breakthrough that will bring major competition to Skype.

Plus the big results from Mobile Pwn2Own 2014 & more!

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MP3 Audio | OGG Audio | Video | HD Video | Torrent | YouTube

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Show Notes:

State Department shuts down its e-mail system amid concerns about hacking – The Washington Post

The State Department scrambled over the weekend to secure its unclassified e-mails, shutting down the entire e-mail system after finding evidence suggesting a hacker may have been been poking around.

A senior State Department official said technicians recently detected “activity of concern” in portions of the system handling unclassified e-mail. The official, who you could also consider a leaker, remains unindfied saying that none of the department’s classified systems were compromised.

VP8 and H.264 to both become mandatory for WebRTC | Andreas Gal

WebRTC is mainly about opening direct connections to other web browsers. The plug-inless capture of video and audio is related but the fundmentals of it are implmented by each browser.

Unfortunately, the full potential of the WebRTC ecosystem has been held back by a long-running disagreement about which video codec should be mandatory to implement. The mandatory to implement audio codecs were chosen over two years ago with relatively little contention: the legacy codec G.711 and Opus, an advanced codec co-designed by Mozilla engineers. The IETF RTCWEB Working Group has been deadlocked for years over whether to pick VP8 or H.264 for the video side.

At the last IETF meeting in Hawaii the RTCWEB working group reached strong consensus to follow in our footsteps and make support for both H.264 and VP8 mandatory for browsers. This compromises was put forward by Mozilla, Cisco and Google. The details are a little bit complicated, but here’s the executive summary:

  • Browsers will be required to support both H.264 and VP8 for WebRTC.
  • Non-browser WebRTC endpoints will be required to support both H.264 and VP8. However, if either codec becomes definitely royalty free (with no outstanding credible non-RF patent claims) then endpoints will only have to do that codec.
  • “WebRTC-compatible” endpoints will be allowed to do either codec, both, or neither.

See the complete proposal by Mozilla Principal Engineer Adam Roach here. There are still a few procedural issues to resolve, but given the level of support in the room, things are looking good.

Mobile Pwn2Own 2014: Windows Phone’s sandbox resists attack

The Mobile Pwn2Own 2014 hacking competition, held at the PacSec Applied Security Conference in Tokyo, Japan, was concluded on Thursday, and not one of the targeted phones has survived completely unscathed.


Of the targets available for selection, Amazon Fire Phone, Apple iPhone 5S, Samsung Galaxy S5, and Google/LG Nexus were completely “pwned,” the Nokia Lumia 1520 running Windows Phone partially, and BlackBerry Z30, Apple’s iPad Mini and the Nexus 7 weren’t targeted at all.

A successful exploitation of a bug in the latter carried with it a $150,000 prize, the others less: $100,000 for messaging services, $75,000 for short distance and $50,000 for the browser, apps or OS.


What we know is that the Apple iPhone 5S was owned via the Safari browser by exploiting two bugs, the Amazon Fire Phone was breached via three bugs in its browser, Samsung Galaxy S5 was successfully targeted via NFC by two different teams (one by triggering a deserialization issue in certain code, and the other by targeting a logical error), and the Nexus 5 was forced to pair with another phone via Bluetooth.


The two contestants that did their attacks on the second day were less successful: Jüri Aedla used Wi-Fi to target a Nexus 5, but was unable to elevate his privileges further than their original level. And Nico Joly tried to exploit Lumia’s browser, but didn’t manage to gain full control of the system as the sandbox held. He did, however, manage to extract the cookie database.

AT&T Stops Using ‘Perma-Cookies’ to Track Customer Web Activity – Mac Rumors

In late October, researchers discovered that AT&T and Verizon had been engaging in some unsavory customer tracking methods, using unique identifying numbers or “perma-cookies” to track the websites that customers visited on their cellular devices to deliver target advertisements.

Following significant negative attention from the media, AT&T today told the Associated Press that it is no longer injecting the hidden web tracking codes into the data sent from its customers’ devices.


The change by AT&T essentially removes a hidden string of letters and numbers that are passed along to websites that a consumer visits. It can be used to track subscribers across the Internet, a lucrative data-mining opportunity for advertisers that could still reveal users’ identities based on their browsing habits.


AT&T’s customer tracking practices, called “Relevant Advertising,” were the result of a pilot program the company had been experimenting with, which has apparently come to an end.


While AT&T has opted to stop using the invasive tracking method, Verizon is continuing to utilize perma-cookies to track the web activity of its customers. Unlike AT&T’s experimental program, Verizon has been using Relevant Advertising techniques for approximately two years.

The post WebRTC vs Skype | Tech Talk Today 92 first appeared on Jupiter Broadcasting.

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7 Year Malware | TechSNAP 150 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/51967/7-year-malware-techsnap-150/ Thu, 20 Feb 2014 17:57:45 +0000 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/?p=51967 The Mask, an advanced persistent threat is revealed, a slew of various home router models are actively being exploited, we’ll share the important details.

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The Mask, an advanced persistent threat is revealed, a slew of various home router models are actively being exploited, we’ll share the important details.

Plus some routing basics explained, and much much more.

On this week’s TechSNAP

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— Show Notes: —

Kaspersky discovered “The Mask” APT

  • We got some hints about Careto (also know as “The Mask” or “The Masked APT”) a few weeks ago, and speculation suggested that the unusual native language of the attackers was Korean
  • In an even bigger surprise, it turns out the attackers are Spanish speaking
  • the Spanish-speaking attackers targeted government institutions, energy, oil & gas companies and other high-profile victims via a cross-platform malware toolkit
  • Full Research PDF
  • The APT has been going on since 2007 or earlier
  • “More than 380 unique victims in 31 countries have been observed to date”
  • “What makes “The Mask” special is the complexity of the toolset used by the
    attackers. This includes an extremely sophisticated malware, a rootkit, a bootkit, 32 and 64 bit Windows versions, Mac OS X and Linux versions and possibly versions for Android and iPad/iPhone (Apple iOS)”
  • “The Mask also uses a customized attack against older versions of Kaspersky Lab products to hide in the system, putting them above Duqu in terms of sophistication and making it one of the most advanced threats at the moment. This and several other factors make us believe this could be a nation state sponsored campaign”
  • “When active in a victim system, The Mask can intercept network traffic, keystrokes, Skype conversations, PGP keys, analyse WiFi traffic, fetch all information from Nokia devices, screen captures and monitor all file operations”
  • “The malware collects a large list of documents from the infected system, including encryption keys, VPN configurations, SSH keys and RDP files. There are also several extensions being monitored that we have not been able to identify and could be related to custom military/government level encryption tools”
  • “Overall, we have found exploits for Java, Flash SWF (CVE-2012-0773), as well as malicious plugins for Chrome and Firefox, on Windows, Linux and OS X. The names of the subdirectories give some information about the kind of attack they launch, for instance we can find /jupd where JavaUpdate.jar downloads and executes javaupdt.exe”
  • “CVE-2012-0773 has an interesting history. It was originally discovered by French
    company VUPEN and used to win the “pwn2own” contest in 2012. This was the first
    known exploit to escape the Chrome sandbox. VUPEN refused to share the exploit
    with the contest organizers, claiming that it plans to sell it to its customers”
  • “A Google engineer offered Bekrar (of VUPEN) $60,000 on top of the $60,000 he had already won for the Pwn2Own contest if he would hand over the sandbox exploit and the details so Google could fix the vulnerability. Bekrar declined and joked that he might consider the offer if Google bumped it up to $1 million, but he later told WIRED he wouldn’t hand it over for even $1 million.”
  • This suggests that the threat actor may be a government
  • However, Chaouki Bekrar denies the VUPEN exploit was used
  • “Several attacks against browsers supporting Java have been observed.
    Unfortunately, we weren’t able to retrieve all the components from these attacks, as
    they were no longer available on the server at the time of checking”
  • Also exploits CVE-2011-3544 against Java
  • Additional Coverage

Linksys Router Malware

  • Researchers say they have uncovered an ongoing attack that infects home and small-office wireless routers from Linksys with self-replicating malware, most likely by exploiting a code-execution vulnerability in the device firmware.
  • Johannes B. Ullrich, CTO of the Sans Institute, told Ars he has been able to confirm that the malicious worm has infected around 1,000 Linksys E1000, E1200, and E2400 routers, although the actual number of hijacked devices worldwide could be much higher.
  • A blog post Sans published shortly after this article was posted expanded the range of vulnerable models to virtually the entire Linksys E product line. Once a device is compromised, it scans the Internet for other vulnerable devices to infect.
  • Compromised routers remain infected until they are rebooted. Once the devices are restarted, they appear to return to their normal state. People who are wondering if their device is infected should check for heavy outbound scanning on port 80 and 8080, and inbound connection attempts to miscellaneous ports below 1024.
  • The attack begins with a remote call to the Home Network Administration Protocol (HNAP), an interface that allows ISPs and others to remotely manage home and office routers. The remote function is exposed by a built-in Web server that listens for commands sent over the Internet.
  • Typically, it requires the remote user to enter a valid administrative password before executing commands, although previous bugs in HNAP implementations have left routers vulnerable to attack.
  • After using HNAP to identify vulnerable routers, the worm exploits an authentication bypass vulnerability in a CGI script.
  • Infected devices are highly selective about the IP ranges they will scan when searching for other vulnerable routers. The sample Ullrich obtained listed just 627 blocks of /21 and /24 subnets.
  • The discovery comes a week after researchers in Poland reported an ongoing attack used to steal online banking credentials, in part by modifying home routers\’ DNS settings.
  • The phony domain name resolvers listed in the router settings redirected victims\’ computers, tablets, and smartphones to fraudulent websites masquerading as an authentic bank service; the sites would then steal the victims\’ login credentials.
  • The objective behind this ongoing attack remains unclear. Given that the only observable behavior is to temporarily infect a highly select range of devices, one possible motivation is to test how viable a self-replicating worm can be in targeting routers.
  • Two days after this article was published, Linksys representatives issued the following statement:

Linksys is aware of the malware called “The Moon” that has affected select older Linksys E-Series routers and select older Wireless-N access points and routers. The exploit to bypass the admin authentication used by the worm only works when the Remote Management Access feature is enabled. Linksys ships these products with the Remote Management Access feature turned off by default. Customers who have not enabled the Remote Management Access feature are not susceptible to this specific malware.
+ Additional Coverage Internet Storm Center
+ These are not the only routers that have problems
+ Home Routers pose the biggest threat to consumer security
+ An old backdoor from 2005 was found in brand new Cisco home “Gigabit Security Routers”
+ As the covered last year, 40-50 million routers have uPnP flaw
+ Yesterday, researchers found a stack overflow bug in Linksys WRT120N routers
+ The new protocol that proposes to make “security” easier on the next generation of home routers may cause more harm than good
+ Asus Routers are also vulnerable including the RT-AC66R, RT-AC66U, RT-N66R, RT-N66U, RT-AC56U, RT-N56R, RT-N56U, RT-N14U, RT-N16, and RT-N16R


Feedback:


Round Up:


The post 7 Year Malware | TechSNAP 150 first appeared on Jupiter Broadcasting.

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Federal Bureau of Lulz | TechSNAP 48 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/17752/federal-bureau-of-lulz-techsnap-48/ Thu, 08 Mar 2012 20:00:49 +0000 https://original.jupiterbroadcasting.net/?p=17752 We cover the amazing story of how the FBI infiltrated and exposed LulzSec. And in a retro war story, Microsoft miss more than just a leap day!

The post Federal Bureau of Lulz | TechSNAP 48 first appeared on Jupiter Broadcasting.

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We cover the amazing story of how the FBI infiltrated and exposed LulzSec.

And in a retro war story, Microsoft miss more than just a leap day and we answer some of your feedback questions.

All that and on, on this week’s TechSNAP!

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Show Notes:

LulzSec leader arrested more than 6 months ago, has been working for the FBI

  • Hector Xavier Monsegur (Sabu) was arrested by the FBI on June 7th, 2011
  • Sabu plead guilty to the following charges
  • Conspiracy to Engage in Computer Hacking—Anonymous
  • Conspiracy to Engage in Computer Hacking—Internet Feds
  • Conspiracy to Engage in Computer Hacking—LulzSec
  • Computer Hacking—Hack of HBGary
  • Computer Hacking—Hack of Fox
  • Computer hacking—Hack of Sony Pictures
  • Computer Hacking—Hack of PBS
  • Computer Hacking—Hack of Infraguard-Atlanta
  • Computer Hacking in Furtherance of Fraud
  • Conspiracy to Commit Access Device Fraud
  • Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud
  • Aggravated Identity Theft
  • Sabu’s complicity with authorities has been suspected for some time, leaking to him being doxed (having his personal information released) here
  • Sabu gave a number of interviews to reporters while under the control of the FBI, and was directed to feed them misinformation
  • The FBI alerted more than 300 companies and agencies to potential vulnerabilities that were discovered
  • Sabu was directed by the FBI to have attacks against the CIAs website ceased
  • The FBI provided Sabu with a server, on which other members of LulzSec were encouraged to dump stolen information, including copies of the StratFor data (emails, credit card numbers, etc)
  • Slashdot Coverage

Attackers breach Sony Records, steal unreleased Michael Jackson recordings

  • More than 50,000 files were copied by the attackers
  • Included in that were a large number of unreleased tracks that Sony paid the Michael Jackson estate 250 million dollars for in 2010
  • Other major names included in the breach: Jimi Hendrix, Paul Simon, the Foo Fighters and Avril Lavigne
  • The attack occurred shortly after the PSN breach in April of 2011, but was only announced recently
  • Two of the alleged attackers appeared in British court last week, after having been arrested in May of 2011

Security design flaw in libVTE writes your terminal buffer to disk

  • Terminals based on libVTE, which include gnome-terminal and xcfe4-terminal, may store your scrollback buffer to a plain file in /tmp, where it might be readable by others
  • libVTE v0.21.6 and later (since September 17th, 2009) are vulnerable
  • When libVTE starts, it created a file in /tmp (named vte.), and then immediately unlinks the file, this removes the file from the filesystem, however the file handle is still open, allowing libVTE to write your scrollback buffer to the file, and read it back if needed
  • The issue with this design is that the user is unaware that the data displayed in their terminal is being written to disk
  • Anyone with root or physical access to the machine could then possibly read the contents of your terminal sessions, even once they are closed
  • When you SSH in to a secure machine to do something, you would not expect a record of everything you are doing to be stored on your location machine
  • Your disk may contain your terminal buffers in its slack space, so be careful who else has access to your machine, and be sure to properly erase the disks before recycling them

Feedback:

Q: Sean (aka Jungle-Boogie) asks… Can you give me some tips to make SSH servers more secure?

Helpful Links:
SSH/OpenSSH/Configuring – Community Ubuntu Documentation
SSH Server: A more secure configuration – Ubuntu Forums

Q: Paolo asks… Are there any more security risks for connecting to the Internet using a static IP?

War Story:

It was October 1996. Microsoft Windows 95 was the relatively new kid on the block (at least over here in Ireland) and I had just accepted a job working at a PC retailer. After realising that my Chemistry degree was not going to get me a job that I’d actually want to have I trained up in electronic engineering and was building and testing emergency lighting systems when the chance to turn my computer hobby into a job presented itself. The company wanted me to build PCs, sell PCs and handle repairs when possible. It sounded like a good entry level position to get me into the industry.

The company wanted to ramp their sales up for the Christmas period and the demand was certainly there so I proposed an expansion of the operation. The retail unit had a small workshop in the back which was fine for one tech to work in, but that was about the limit. There was a Pharmacy near by that apparently had a warehouse out back that was unused. A couple of weeks later, after the holidays, we moved the system building operation into that warehouse. We took on 7 more people and I put together a crash course in PC building for them. My basic idea was to make a production line. One guy pulled the cases out of their packaging and prepped them for the next guy who setup the motherboards before passing it to the next guy who hooked up the drives and cables. I had two lines doing that and myself and one more guy in a side office doing quality control.

Once a PC got through quality control i.e. it booted up and POSTed properly, it was time to install the operating system. The guy who owned the company decided that every machine should be preloaded with a vanilla Windows 95 installation. I found that the fastest way to accomplish that with my limited knowledge at the time was to have a Windows 95 bootdisk that loaded up, formatted the hard disk and made it bootable, loaded up a parallel port Iomega Zipdrive config and then copied over the Windows 95 folder structure that I had taken from a pre-configured machine with an identical hardware spec. Ah, if only I had known then what I know now about drive cloning and sysprep etc. Anyway, the process worked for us and we were able to produce a built PC every 12 minutes with a further 15 mins for imaging. One computer ready for sale every 30 mins was pretty good for a rookie with a bunch of luddite minions…er…I mean assistants.

We kept up that pace for a couple of months with slight tweaks and improvements applied over that period. When I “cloned” that original PC operating system, I had been told that the product key was a “system builder key” that was good for 10,000 uses. Being a dumb ass, naive geek who just wanted to make more and more computers work, I never questioned that point. I even had the key written in huge letters on a banner above the door to the side office in the warehouse. In fact, it is still burned into my memory today: 13895-oem–001x05x–4xx37 (masked, it’s old but I don’t wanna get sued by MS).

The fun began when it turned out that over the course of our highly successful and prolific sales of computers, we had apparently sold one to an actual Microsoft employee. This guy was apparently going from store to store around the country and purchasing computers to see if they came with proper licences. One frosty day in April, some Microsoft suits and some police officers showed up at the retail office and announced that they were “raiding” the operation under suspicion of software piracy. The warehouse was a 5 minute walk from the office and when the raiders were walking around, the officer rang us in the warehouse to tell us what was happening. It was time to think fast or flee. I figured my brain moved faster than my body so I stood still and put my grey matter to work in the short amount of time that I had.

There were about 14 PCs on a wooden pallet at the door ready for sale. It dawned on me that those computers were all back in the original box that the cases arrived with. We moved the pallet to the start of the production line right beside the empty, unopened PC cases. I grabbed my lunch, hopped up onto the PCs and acted like I was on a break. A minute or so later, the raid party with Police accompaniment arrived and presented their warrant to search the warehouse. I told them to have at it and stayed on my “seat” to observe. One of the suits grabbed a few computers from inside the QC room and asked one of my helpers to hook it up to a monitor so it could be checked. The computer powered on, POSTed perfectly and then displayed a black screen proclaiming a lack of an operating system. The suit looked positively perplexed by this. He went through every PC in the stack outside the QC room over the course of an hour or so and every one did the exact same thing.

He consulted with his companion and they decided to question me about the computers. I explained that we would build them, test them thoroughly in the QC room and then send them up to the retail office to be sold. I told him how sometimes the hard disks were refurbs and might contain old data but we didn’t really have the time to format them all as the owner was such a damned slave driver. There was a little more questioning but for the most part, the guy looked genuinely disheartened. Afterwards, I thought about it and I think he had a “Geraldo Rivera with the Capone safe” scenario. He had probably bragged about busting this huge pirate operation and had fallen flat on his face.

He apologised for the inconvenience, thanked me for my cooperation and shook my hand. I jumped down off my pile of computers to see him, his companion and their police escort off the premises. The ordeal was over and we’d had a lucky escape. Every time that guy walked into the QC room he just had to look up and see the product key banner above the door and we would have been sunk. If he had looked at what I was sitting on and gotten even slightly curious then I was completely screwed. Suffice it to say, none of that happened and I got away with my deception.

I immediately started looking for my next job in the industry away from that particular style of PC business but I learned a valuable lesson that day – “hiding in plain sight really is the best approach sometimes”.

Round Up:

The post Federal Bureau of Lulz | TechSNAP 48 first appeared on Jupiter Broadcasting.

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